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The World of Fifty (Interoperable) Facebooks
Przemysław Pałka*
This Article envisions a “world of fifty facebooks,” where numerous
companies would offer interoperable services, similar to the one currently
provided by Facebook Inc. As is the case with telephones, where customers
of AT&T can call and text those of T-Mobile or Verizon, users of A-Book
should be able to find, communicate with, and see the content of customers
of B-Book, C-Book, etc. Facebook Inc. should be required to allow potential
competitors to become interoperable with its platform and to grant them
access to its network. Today, Facebook Inc. uses its artificially created
monopolistic position to impose excessive costs and unnecessary harms on
consumers and society.
This Article presents a new theory of the “price” that Facebook Inc.
charges for its services, going beyond the conventional wisdom that users
pay for access with their “personal data and attention.” It argues that
Facebook Inc. imposes on its users: (i) cognitive harms (emotional
manipulation, risk of psychological and mental health problems); (ii)
behavioral harms (unwanted purchases, wasted time, risk of addiction);
and (iii) privacy/security harms (risk of having amassed personal data
stolen by hackers). The company also (iv) freerides on users’ creative
content and labor. Each of these harms constitutes a higher “price” or
lower quality than could be available in a competitive market.
Importantly, these costs do not result from the necessary features of “a
facebook” but rather from Facebook Inc.’s data-collection-heavy,
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targeted-advertising-driven business model. Less harmful models,
however, are available.
The Article surveys possible legal strategies for achieving and
sustaining “the world of fifty facebooks.” As the debates about regulation
of large platforms continue in the US and the EU, this Article serves as a
reminder that, as a society, we face a choice. We might accept the central
role that platforms like Facebook Inc. currently play in our socioeconomic
lives and focus solely on taming the most abusive behaviors they engage
in. Alternatively, we might embrace the fact that there is nothing natural
nor necessary about this position and concentrate on restructuring the
online power relationships. Doing so requires imagination and political
will, and this Article aims at fostering both.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world where the telephone was invented ten years ago
and ever since has been offered by one company only, Telephone Inc.
Imagine that Telephone Inc. insists that it is technologically impossible
for other providers to be interoperable with its product. If you use
Telephone Inc., you can only call and receive calls from other Telephone
Inc. customers. Even when Smartphone Inc. creates a similar and
complementary service, you cannot use it to call people who are
Telephone Inc. customers. As a result, even though other companies
would like to enter the market and compete by offering lower prices and
higher quality, network effects prevent them from doing so. Everyone
is already “on Telephone.” Subsequently, the monopolist can impose
contract conditions that consumers would not have otherwise accepted,
such as listening to all of your phone calls and inserting ads in the middle
of conversations.
You might think this thought experiment is strange; phones of
various providers can obviously be interoperable with one another. But
ask yourself, would this be evident to an inhabitant of a world where the
telephone has always been provided by just one company? Inhabitants
of that world still need to realize this otherwise simple fact.
We are the inhabitants of that world, though it is Facebook Inc., not
Telephone Inc., that we falsely believe to be a “natural” monopolist.
Facebook Inc. is currently the monopolist in the market for
facebooks, the new universal way to communicate and coordinate social
life.1 It excludes competitors from offering consumers similar services
by artificially creating access barriers to the network of the platform’s
users.2 Given the network effects—”everyone” already “being on
1

Throughout the Article, the word “Facebook” is used in three different ways: (1)
“Facebook Inc.” refers to the company; (2) “Facebook” refers to the platform (the
product) offered by Facebook Inc.; (3) and “a facebook” refers to the kind of
communication tool that Facebook is an example of.
2 Moreover, Facebook Inc. has proactively engaged in various strategies aimed at
removing emerging competitors in their nascent forms in order to preserve its
dominance. See TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 119–26
(2018). According to Jon Sarlin, Facebook Inc. uses a three-prong strategy of “buy, deny
and apply,” where it either purchases early-stage potential competitions, including
Instagram in 2012 and WhatsApp in 2014; denies competitors access to its data or APIs
(as was the case with Vine); or copies functionalities developed by other companies (as
was the case with Snapchat, and now with Facebook Dating). The “deny” strategy
especially exemplifies how Facebook Inc. purposely limits its technical interoperability
to limit competition. See Jon Sarlin, This is How Facebook Kills its Competition, CNN
BUSINESS (Mar. 21, 2019) https://www.cnn.com/videos/business/2019/03/21/this-ishow-facebook-kills-its-competition.cnn-business/video/playlists/business-facebook.
These activities are at the core of the most recent lawsuit that the Federal Trade
Commission [hereinafter “the FTC”] has filed against Facebook Inc., together with 48
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Facebook”—potential competitors cannot fairly compete on quality and
price.3
There is nothing “natural” or “necessary,” however, about
Facebook Inc.’s monopoly over the network of people using the service
of “a facebook.”4 Facebook is not like railways, or bridges, or the electric
grid.5 Technologically speaking, just like with the telephone, facebooks
provided by different companies could be interoperable with one
another.6 It is a question of how we want to structure the world we live
in; a question of imagination and political will. You could be using ABook, I could be using B-Book, and our friend could be using C-Book, and
still, we should be able to add each other as friends, communicate and
coordinate social life through the same medium offered by different
providers. We would all have access to the same “online space,” just
provided by many companies, offering varying business conditions.
This world is technologically possible. Why is it normatively desirable?

Attorneys General. See Cecilia Kang & Mike Isaac, U.S. and States Say Facebook Illegally
Crushed Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/
technology/facebook-antitrust-monopoly.html; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC
Sues Facebook for Illegal Monopolization (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-sues-facebook-illegal-monopolization [hereinafter
“the FTC’s Facebook lawsuit press release”].
3 See Thomas E. Kadri, Digital Gatekeepers, 99 TEXAS L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 34), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3665040
(arguing that “[d]ue to the network effects that underlie many platforms’ success, people
are loath to experiment with new players unless enough of their friends do too.
Interoperability is one way to counteract these high switching costs, and protecting
adversarial interoperability ensures that the existing platforms don’t retain a veto
power over innovation that threatens their market dominance”).
4 For an argument that Facebook is a “natural monopoly,” see, e.g., Dipayan Ghosh,
Don’t Break Up Facebook—Treat It Like a Utility, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 30, 2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/05/dont-break-up-facebook-treat-it-like-a-utility (“I contend
that Facebook and firms like it have become natural monopolies that necessitate a novel,
stringent set of regulations to obstruct their capitalistic overreaches and protect the
public against ingrained economic exploitation.”).
5 Even if, for the adjudication purposes, it might sometimes be useful to act as if it
was similar to railroads or other infrastructure. For an example of such a case, see
Nikolas Guggenberger, Essential Platforms, 24 STAN. TECH. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3703361
(arguing that the doctrine of essential facilities should be applied to temper platforms’
dominant position, as “[w]hat the railroads were to the early twentieth century, digital
platforms have become to the early twenty-first century”). Guggenberger is correct as
a matter of description, but unlike railroads for trains, platforms do not have to be allencompassing vehicles for online interaction.
6 See infra Section IV.A. For an explanation of how opening the APIs could lead to
much higher interoperability between the online platforms, see Katarzyna
Szymielewicz, A New Deal for Data, STARTUP (Nov. 14, 2019), https://medium.com/swlh/
a-new-deal-for-data-1c6d7c850e25.
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As a monopolist, Facebook Inc. can impose various costs on
consumers, costs that consumers would refuse to accept in a
competitive market. Those go beyond the conventional wisdom
according to which “users pay for Facebook with data and attention”7
and include (i) cognitive harms,8 (ii) behavioral harms,9 (iii)
privacy/security harms,10 and (iv) freeriding on users’ creative content
and labor.11 One might treat these costs as a higher “price” that users
pay or lower quality of the service that consumers receive.12 But there
is no necessary connection between these costs and the features of the
service Facebook Inc. provides to consumers.
On the contrary, these costs are a consequence of a toxic business
model—based on never-ending data collection and targeted
advertising—which Facebook Inc. can rely on, given its monopolistic
position.13 This business model incentivizes Facebook Inc. to “addict”
users to the platform and have them engage as much as possible, even if
this means that more “negative” content is shown to them.14 Other
business models are possible, however, including subscription fees, or
revenue from non-data-collection-driven advertising, or a model where
7 See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 4 (“The currency extracted from individuals in the
consumer internet context is typically not money, but a novel, complex combination of
the individual’s personal data and attention.”).
8 See infra Section III.B.1; see also JARON LANIER, TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR
SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS RIGHT NOW 81–92 (2018); Przemysław Pałka, Private Law and
Cognitive Science, in LAW AND MIND (Bartosz Brozek & Jaap Hage eds., forthcoming 2021).
9 See infra Section III.B.2; see also JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 83–98 (2019); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE
OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER
74–96 (2019); Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449,
461–73 (2019).
10 See infra Section III.B.3. See generally Ido Kilovaty, Privatized Cybersecurity Law,
11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
11 See infra Section III.B.4; see also ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL MARKETS
205–23 (2018).
12 For a general overview of harmful effects of the online platforms operating based
on their current business models, see James Niels Rosenquist & Fiona M. Scott Morton,
The Disutility of Exploitative Technology: Implications for Regulation and Antitrust
(Working Paper presented at the “Big Tech and Antitrust Conference” at Yale Law School
in New Haven CT, on Oct. 3–4, 2020; manuscript with the author); see also STIGLER CTR.
COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF DIG. PLATFORMS, MARKET STRUCTURE AND ANTITRUST SUBCOMMITTEE
REPORT 23–138 (2019), https://www.chicagobooth.edu/research/stigler/news-andmedia/committee-on-digital-platforms-final-report [hereinafter “THE STIGLER REPORT”].
13 See infra Section III.A.
14 See
JACK BALKIN, FIXING SOCIAL MEDIA’S GRAND BARGAIN 4 (2018),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf
(“The more digital companies know about people’s emotional vulnerabilities and
predispositions, the more easily they can structure individual end-user experience to
addict end users to the site.”); LANIER, supra note 8; Rosenquist & Scott Morton, supra
note 12.
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users are compensated for their creativity and labor.15 The price of
using “a facebook” could be much lower.16
Hence, I argue that Facebook Inc. should be required to give
potential competitors access to its platform and network, allowing other
companies to offer similar and complementary services which are
interoperable with the Facebook service and network. I envision a
“world of fifty facebooks,” with many businesses competing on price,
quality, and innovation. These companies could offer people novel
contractual conditions, better corresponding to what consumers
actually prefer. For example, A-Book could offer no data collection and
no ads, but a subscription fee. B-Book could offer could offer an adbased model with less data collection and with fact-checking as a part of
the service. C-Book could compensate its users for their time, labor, and
content, etc. Moreover, complementary services (add-ons) could
emerge in addition to these full-fledged substitutes, ranging from
companies curating and moderating content to enhancing the
experience in any other way. Such competition would allow consumers
to better express their preferences, minimize the consumer surplus
extraction by the monopolist, and lead to higher consumer benefits and
more efficient allocation of social resources. But it will only become
possible once the network of facebooks users is not intrinsically linked
to one service, as it is today.
Competition in the market for facebooks is necessary, but not
sufficient, to tackle all the harms and costs of informational capitalism.17
The newly created market will need to be regulated, both to ensure the
interoperability of the services (technical standards)18 and to minimize
15

See infra Section III.A. For arguments supporting compensation not just for
content and labor but for all the harms stemming from using social media (claiming that
the surplus is much lower than we tend to assume) see generally Hunt Allcott, Luca
Braghieri, Sarah Eichmeyer & Matthew Gentzkow, The Welfare Effects of Social Media,
110 AM. ECON. REV. 629 (2019).
16 “Price” both as in “the price for a cup of coffee is $3” and “a knee injury is the price
you pay for jogging in the wrong shoes.”
17 For the definition of the term, see COHEN, supra note 9, at 5–6 (“[T]he alignment of
capitalism as a mode of production with informationalism as a mode of development.
Capitalism ‘is oriented toward profit-maximizing, that is, toward increasing the amount
of surplus appropriated by capital on the basis of the private control over the means of
production and circulation,’ while informationalism ‘is oriented . . . toward the
accumulation of knowledge and towards higher levels of complexity in information
processing.’ In a regime of informational capitalism, market actors use knowledge,
culture, and networked information technologies as means of extracting and
appropriating surplus value, including consumer surplus.”).
18 As is the case with telephones. See Ian Walden, Access and Interconnection, in
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND REGULATION (Ian Walden ed. 2018); see also infra Section
IV.B.
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some externalities, such as certain types of discrimination19 and
manipulation.20 Nevertheless, the regulation of service providers’
conduct is one of the possible modes of governance; we should not
discount other options, including market forces.21 And, for these forces
to operate, competition is necessary. As of today, Facebook Inc. has
none. It is up to us, as a society, to decide whether we want to accept
the central role of the large platforms and only regulate them at the
margins, or whether we will challenge their position. At least regarding
Facebook Inc., I argue we should do the latter.
There are many ways to transition from the world we live in now
to the “world of fifty facebooks.” They include, among others, enacting
new regulation and enforcing existing antitrust laws. It is not my
ambition in this Article to outline these strategies in detail. I do not
engage with questions of how a particular policy reform should be
conducted (institutionally, or what should be the exact content of rules),
or how the antitrust case should be argued. Each of these questions
would need a paper of its own. I look at the problem from the bird’s-eye
policy perspective and from a conceptual standpoint. This means that
for a reader deeply immersed in technical debates in
telecommunications law,22 utilities regulation,23 or antitrust law,24 my
usage of terms like “monopolist,” “product market” or
“interoperability”25 might seem rather general. This is because, rather
than arguing for a particular interpretation of existing laws, or a specific
phrasing of the provisions to be enacted, I want to make a normative
19 For a discussion of race- and gender-based discrimination in data-driven ad
delivery, see Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, 1301 ARXIV
6822 (2013), https://arxiv.org/abs/1301.6822; see also Muhammad Ali et al.,
Discrimination through Optimization: How Facebook’s Ad Delivery Can Lead to Skewed
Outcomes, 1904 ARXIV 02095 (2019), https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.02095.
20 See Eliza Mik, The Erosion of Autonomy in Online Consumer Transactions, 8 L.
INNOVATION & TECH. 1, 1–2 (2016). See generally Kilovaty, supra note 9.
21 For the canonical discussion the interrelationship between law and regulation,
design and markets see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
(1999).
22 See Walden, supra note 18.
23 For an analysis of Facebook’s (and other tech companies) behavior from the
perspective of utilities regulation, see generally K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities:
Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept,
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2018).
24 For an example of how an antitrust case against Facebook could be argued in the
United States, see Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s
Journey Towards Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy,
16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39 (2019). For an argument for changing the way we understand
the logic of antitrust law in the technology sphere, though on the case study of Amazon,
not Facebook, see Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017).
25 See infra Section IV.A.
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claim regarding the aims that the law should pursue. I sketch the goal
and justify it. My ambition is to imagine the world of fifty facebooks,
convince the reader we should aim at it, and sketch the possible
pathways without providing an itinerary.
At the time of this writing, two important developments have just
occurred. First, on December 9, 2020, the FTC, together with the
Attorneys General of forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and Guam,
filed a lawsuit against Facebook Inc.26 The lawsuit petitions “for a
permanent injunction and other equitable relief against Defendant
Facebook, Inc., . . . to undo and prevent its anticompetitive conduct and
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce in violation of
Section 5 [of the FTC Act].”27 In particular, the FTC seeks to break up
Facebook horizontally (“divestiture of assets, divestiture or
reconstruction of businesses (including, but not limited to, Instagram
and/or WhatsApp”)).28 Moreover, it intends to significantly limit future
mergers and acquisitions,29 as well as to halt anticompetitive behavior
in vertical relations.30
It is hard to overstate the importance of this lawsuit. Of course, it
will take time, and without a doubt, Facebook Inc. will fight back hard.
But the process is already in motion. Importantly, even though the FTC
did not ask the court to require Facebook Inc.’s horizontal
interoperability (though, arguably, it does seek to increase vertical
interoperability), we should remember that the case can come to an end
in various ways. It might end up with a judgment, but it might just as
well (and probably will) be resolved through a settlement. There, the
parties can agree to anything, including horizontal interoperability. I
hope that this Article serves as a source for inspiration for why the FTC
should pursue this goal and provide additional ammunition for those
seeking to explain why exactly Facebook Inc.’s artificial monopolization
of access to the network of users comes with a significant cost to society
and consumers. Hopefully, a similar suit will follow across the Atlantic,
in the European Union. In the end, Facebook Inc.’s conduct is in breach
26 See Complaint, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-03590 (D.D.C.
Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/051_2021.01.21_
revised_partially_redacted_complaint.pdf [hereinafter “The FTC’s Facebook Lawsuit”]
(Public redacted version of document filed under seal); see also Cecilia Kang & Mike
Isaac, U.S. and States Say Facebook Illegally Crushed Competition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/09/technology/facebook-antitrustmonopoly.html.
27 The FTC’s Facebook Lawsuit, supra note 26 at 1.
28 Id. at 51.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 52 (noting “that Facebook is permanently enjoined from imposing
anticompetitive conditions on access to APIs and data”).
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of a fundamental principle of the liberal democratic political economy,
i.e., opposition to the unchecked private power of a monopolist.31 This
principle, on the small “c” constitutional level, is very similar both in the
US and the EU, even if the details of the laws concretizing this principle
are different in both jurisdictions.32
Second, on December 15, 2020, the European Commission released
drafts of the long-awaited Digital Services Act (DSA)33 and Digital
Market Act (DMA).34 The former instrument seeks to “set out uniform
rules for a safe, predictable and trusted online environment, where
fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter are effectively protected,”35
whereas the latter lays down “rules ensuring contestable and fair
markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are
present.”36 Given that these laws, when enacted, will apply to the
American-based companies directing their services at European Union
residents, one should keep them in mind when seeking ways to create
the world of fifty facebooks.
The current versions hint at
interoperability several times, especially regarding ad-repositories,37
various information sharing systems,38 and non-discrimination in
access to the APIs.39 This is, by far, not enough; however, the legislative
process has just begun, and the text can still be changed. The enactment
of the General Data Protection Regulation40 in 2016, which, despite

31

See WU, supra note 2, at 76–77.
But, despite some significant differences between the particular solutions and the
currently predominant normative theories in both jurisdictions, the internal logic of the
antitrust laws in the US and the EU are quite similar. See Guggenberger, supra note 5, at
47 (arguing that, at least genealogically, the European and the American antitrust law
are much closer aligned that one would nowadays assume). For a comprehensive
comparison of these two systems, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAWS (2014).
33 See European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and
amending Directive 2000/31/EC, Brussels, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM(2020) 825),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0825&
from=en [hereinafter “the DSA”].
34 See European Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (Digital Markets
Act), EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM (2020) 842), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020PC0842&from=en [hereinafter “the DMA”].
35 See the DSA, supra note 33, art. 1.2.b.
36 See the DMA, supra note 34, art. 1.1.
37 See the DSA, supra note 33, art. 34.1.e.
38 Id. art. 67.
39 Id. art. 6.1.c, 6.1.f.
40 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and the Council of 27
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
32
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being heavily lobbied, ended up establishing quite consumer-friendly
obligations on companies, is one reason to believe that the Europeans
will succeed in laying down strict rules governing companies like
Facebook Inc. But—and this is of utmost importance—it is not enough
to “tame” large online platforms’ behavior. The very structure of online
power can be decentralized and democratized, and I hope that this
Article will serve as an encouragement to do so for the European
legislators.
This Article consists of three parts. Part II explains exactly what
service Facebook Inc provides from the consumers’ point of view and
why it constitutes its own product market, where the platform and the
network are intrinsically connected. It also imagines what a competitive
market in facebooks could look like. Part III demonstrates why the
current business model of Facebook Inc. is not necessary, surveys the
types of harms it imposes on consumers, and demonstrates how those
harms could be avoided in a competitive market. Part IV sketches some
ideas about the legal strategy for transitioning from the status quo to the
“world of fifty facebooks,” including a more general analysis of the
concept of interoperability, the role of regulation as both a facilitator of
competition, and as a way to combat certain abusive practices across the
board.
II. WHAT IS “A FACEBOOK”?
In this Part, I argue that “a facebook” is a new, universal tool for
social communication, intrinsically connected to the network of people
using it. Facebook Inc. created this tool and is currently the monopolist
in the market for facebooks. I explain why, instead of thinking about
Facebook Inc. as competing in the market for “social media,” we should
treat its service and network as a separate type of product. I analyze
what the characteristics of this product are. Finally, I provide a first
sketch of the world where several companies, fully interoperable with
one another, could be offering the same type of service, or some
complementary add-ons to it.

personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC
(General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter GDPR].
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A. A Multifunctional Tool and the Network of Users
From the consumers’ (users’) perspective,41 a facebook is
essentially seven things, analytically capable of being studied
separately, but phenomenologically necessarily interrelated:
1. A Search Engine for People/Uniform Identifier System,
where one can “find” a person using the search
function and “friend” or “follow” them. In this sense, a
facebook is a “phonebook,” all-encompassing and
perpetually up to date;
2. A Direct Messaging System, where the messenger tool
allows people to call or send messages to each other;
3. A Coordination Tool, where users can coordinate
logistics of common projects and social life, through
functionalities like Events, Groups, or Marketplace;
4. A Blogging/Vlogging Service, where each user’s
Timeline is their own personal site, supported by an
interface allowing the user to upload content and
enabling others to engage with it by “reacting” with
emojis, commenting, or sharing—a tool for content
production;
5. A Content Aggregator, where each user sees a
personalized Newsfeed and does not have to “visit”
blogs she is interested in individually but can simply
rely on the provider’s algorithm to display the most
“relevant” content—a tool for convenient content
consumption;
6. A Tool for Accessing the Network of People
simultaneously using the same service;
7. An ID system, allowing users to “log into” other
services using their Facebook account.
These seven functionalities, taken together, characterize the
product offered by Facebook Inc. in the year 2021 and, subsequently,
the product market in which Facebook Inc. operates. Other “social
media companies”—like Twitter, LinkedIn, TikTok, etc.—offer different
types of products. These products cannot be substitutes, both because
they lack certain functionalities that render a facebook the universal
41 For purposes of this Article’s argument, I am not looking at the services that
Facebook provides for advertisers and its role in the ads market. The reason is that, as
I show, ads are not a conceptually necessary part of the Facebook environment; the
company’s business model could be different when monetization of the consumer
product is concerned, and it is the consumer product that I want to focus on. For analysis
of Facebook’s role in the ads market, from the competition policy perspective, see
BRITISH COMPETITION AND MKTS. AUTH., ONLINE PLATFORMS AND DIGITAL ADVERTISING: MARKET
STUDY INTERIM REPORT (2020), https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-platforms-anddigital-advertising-market-study.
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tool of communication and because their networks are not
interoperable.
What makes Facebook so appealing to users, such that despite
numerous scandals concerning privacy,42 experimenting on users
without their consent,43 alleged negative consequences for mental
health,44 and a dubious role in the political process,45 Facebook’s user
base is growing,46 generating more and more profits for the company?47
This, in one sense, is an empirical question, requiring rigorous
qualitative and quantitative studies, which I would be more than happy
to see conducted. It is also a conceptual question, however, and below I
offer a theory explaining what makes Facebook not only a product
market of its own but also such a desirable product that people are
willing to pay a much higher price for it than necessary.
1. A “Phonebook” and the Network Effects
Let us start with the first functionality listed above, the one that
gave Facebook its name—a facebook, a search engine for people and a
tool for staying connected. Many American colleges and professional
schools print such booklets for their students, faculty, and staff,
facilitating intra-institutional communication. After a couple of years,
however, these booklets are no longer useful for communication (they
might be useful for archival purposes, or as souvenirs). But what if these
booklets somehow updated themselves all the time? You pull out a
catalog of your classmates from ten years ago, see their current pictures,
phone numbers, occupation, and emails? That would be useful,
wouldn’t it?

42

For an overview of privacy scandals that Facebook has been involved in, see James
Sanders & Dan Patterson, Facebook Data Privacy Scandal: A Cheat Sheet, TECHREPUBLIC
(July 24, 2019), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/facebook-data-privacyscandal-a-cheat-sheet.
43 See Kashmir Hill, Facebook Manipulated 689,003 Users’ Emotions for Science,
FORBES (June 28, 2014, 2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/
28/facebook-manipulated-689003-users-emotions-for-science; see also Kilovaty, supra
note 9, at 473.
44 See Ravi Chandra, Is Facebook Destroying Society and Your Mental Health?, PSYCH.
TODAY (Jan. 29, 2018) https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-pacific-heart/
201801/is-facebook-destroying-society-and-your-mental-health.
45 See Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the
Fallout So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/
politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html.
46 See infra Section III.A.
47 See infra Section III.A.
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Try to imagine all the people that you know, whom you have met
at some point: your friends and teachers from high school, former
colleagues, distant relatives, people you met at a conference, etc. That
is a large group. You do not have most of their phone numbers or email
addresses. There is a significant group of people that you “know,” you
“met,” but whom you cannot reach.
Facebook solves this problem. Especially for the generations that
en masse signed up for it—definitely the millennial generation (82% of
American millennials are Facebook users)48—but also for 30% of the
entire Earth’s population,49 there is a very high chance that people can
stay in touch using the platform. If you add someone as a friend in
college, they will “remain your friend” a decade later. If you meet
someone at a party, an easy way to stay in touch is to become friends on
Facebook. You can do it on your computer or using your smartphone. It
is convenient, fast, and reliable. Additionally, even if you did not add
someone as a friend on Facebook at the time when you met, you can still
find them there later. The “search” function, combined with the
company’s policy requiring people to use their real names50 and the
functionality displaying “common friends” with other people, is a
powerful tool for “rediscovering” and “reconnecting with” people you
once met.
In this sense, Facebook Inc.’s product is an ever-updated college
facebook, or, even better, a universal phonebook. A phonebook where,
instead of phone numbers, you get to “friend” someone and message
them on Facebook. And where the absolute monopolist is Facebook Inc.
For, to be able to rely on this “phonebook”—as there are no “phone
numbers,” only the ability to connect within the specific service—you
need to be a user of Facebook.

48 Out of 71 million millennials in the United States, 58.3 million are Facebook users.
This amounts to 82 percent. See J. Clement, Number of Facebook Users By Age in the U.S.
2018, STATISTA (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/398136/usfacebook-user-age-groups; Millennials, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Millennials (last visited Dec. 31, 2020).
49 Facebook reported its monthly user base reached 2.498 billion in 2019. See
Facebook Investor Relations, Facebook Quarterly Earnings Slides, at 3,
https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2019/q4/Q4-2019-EarningsPresentation-_final.pdf [hereinafter “Facebook 2019 report”]. At the time of this
Article’s writing, Earths population equals 7.83 billion, see World Population,
WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population (last visited Dec. 31,
2020). Both numbers are growing.
50 See Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last
visited Dec. 31, 2020) (“When people stand behind their opinions and actions, our
community is safer and more accountable. For this reason, you must . . . [u]se the same
name that you use in everyday life.”) [hereinafter “Facebook Terms”].
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2. Messaging and Social Coordination
Facebook is not just a “phonebook,” it is also a tool for
communication and social coordination. You can text, send files or
images, call, or video call all your “friends.” It is a modern phone. Of
course, other tools allow you to do the same—email, texting, or Skype.
But to communicate with people using those tools, you need to know
their number, email address, or Skype ID. A facebook is both a way to
find someone and to contact them. Besides, there are tools other than
direct messaging and calls, making communication and coordination
even more accessible.
Facebook also allows you to create “events” and invite people to
your public lecture, a birthday party, or a movie marathon. These events
can be private or public. You can use them to coordinate with your close
friends, with people you somehow know, and even to promote open to
the public activities you organize.
Then, there are “groups:” a group for legal scholars, for local
volunteers, for your sports team, for philosophy fans, etc. The groups
are the next incarnation of “online forums.” To give an anecdotal
example, one of my younger cousins, currently in middle school, created
a Facebook account because the entirety of the communication among
her peers, from social life to homework self-help, was being coordinated
via a Facebook group. As anecdotal as this example might be, it indicates
a wider trend—to be “included” becomes largely synonymous with
having to use the services of Facebook Inc. Some people might have the
luxury to opt out; many others, however, have little choice other than to
start a Facebook account.
Finally, various other functionalities for coordination—like
Facebook “marketplace” (competition to eBay), “dating” (competition to
Tinder or Bumble), or “jobs” (competition to LinkedIn), and others
(definitely in the pipeline)—make access to the network even more
profitable as different kinds of coordination are enabled. But, as of
today, the only way to get access is to use the services of Facebook Inc.
All this taken together—the ability to find people, to stay in touch,
and to communicate with them through various types of tools dedicated
to the particular needs of humans—makes Facebook so appealing. And
we have not even gotten to perhaps the most visible functionality of
Facebook—that of content creation and consumption.
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3. Content Production and Consumption
You learn a lot of information on Facebook, from the fact that your
primary school friend got married and had a baby, to the fact that a new
funny cat video is available, to social and political news. Over half of
Americans read their news on social media (here this category also
includes other sites).51 Facebook is a way to consume content, from
gossip, over entertainment, to information.
At the same time, if you choose to, you can keep the world informed
about what you are up to in the same way. You got a new job—change
your “about” section on Facebook. Your relationship status changed—
indicate that on Facebook.52 You took a nice photo, read an interesting
article, want to spread knowledge about a local initiative—share it on
Facebook. It is a tool for informing your peers about your life, thoughts,
and ideas.
Moreover, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, the ability to
“go live” on Facebook—produce or consume streaming video—has
become incredibly useful to many people and organizations. Large
swaths of our lives, including lectures and classes, religious services and
prayers, motivational talks, and workouts, moved online, many of them
to Facebook. Of course, other providers—YouTube and Zoom among
them—made going live possible. If you are organizing an online lecture,
however, Facebook presents many advantages, not least the fact that
you can invite literally every one of your Facebook friends, which could
be close to everyone you know. If your class, church, or club already
communicates via a Facebook group, this will be a natural platform to
do streaming.
Finally, Facebook enables users to be creative and produce content,
as well as to be passive or active content consumers. If your friend
shares something you find outrageous, you can indicate that with an
“angry” emoji or write a comment. If you prefer, however, you can
refrain from reacting, and just scroll further. In this sense, Facebook is
a TV and a newspaper, where everyone can be the producer, and
everyone can re-print/re-broadcast (by linking or sharing) the content
of others. And it is up to you to choose who will see what. Content may
be public or private, but you always have the option to allow your
51 See Peter Suciu, More Americans Are Getting Their News From Social Media, FORBES
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2019/10/11/moreamericans-are-getting-their-news-from-social-media.
52 This phenomenon is so widespread that numerous memes emerged, where the
pun usually is the celebrant saying, “I now pronounce you husband and wife, you may
now change your relationship status.” Everything Funny, PINTEREST,
https://www.pinterest.com/pin/25825397835850492/.
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“friends” to see your content, just as they have the option to allow you
to see theirs.
4. The Network and the ID System
From a user’s perspective, what matters is that all these
functionalities are available at the same time, within the same service,
internally interoperable. Each functionality is useful and worth
something. But the total utility a Facebook user derives from the
platform is not just the sum of these utilities. It is also the usefulness of
being able to rely on various functionalities when communicating with
various people interchangeably. If you meet someone at a work
conference and “friend” them on Facebook to stay in touch, akin to
asking for their phone number, you also benefit from seeing the content
they share, the comments they make on your posts, or the groups they
might invite you to in the future.
Other social media might serve some of the needs that Facebook
does. Twitter is a great platform to share and consume content, but not
for finding your primary school friends. It does not allow you to call
your contacts, or to create events or groups. LinkedIn might be a good
professional tool for authenticating your CV, building a professional
network, and helping you find some people you met, but it will not be a
source of funny content or a way to organize a birthday party for your
child. Facebook is the new universal communication tool, allowing one
to do all these things in one place.
Moreover, Facebook accounts—given the company’s requirement
to use one’s actual name—can often be used as a reliable way to identify
people online. For this reason, numerous other services—from Spotify
to Tinder to a host of others—allow you to log in to their services using
your Facebook account. Once you do so, it is harder to quit. Not
impossible, but harder.
In the context of all these considerations, we can begin to grasp the
power of the network effects that benefit Facebook Inc. Facebook Inc. is
not just a neat product or a robust network of people but instead a
robust network of people using a neat product at the same time.
There is no technical reason, however, why this medium of
communication, and access to the global network of people, needs to be
provided by one operator only.53 Facebook can be interoperable with
other platforms serving exactly the same needs, or providing subsidiary
services—it is possible to open up the network to competitors’ access.54
53
54

See Szymielewicz, supra note 6.
Id.
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The reason we do not live in this world is a business reason—Facebook
Inc., unless forced by the law to open up to competition, has no interest
in sharing its full dominance in the market for facebook(s) with other
actors. Hence, to change this state of affairs, the law needs to step in.
Governing bodies must undertake new regulations, antitrust cases, or
both, requiring the company to open up. The success of these
interventions, at least on the policy level, depends on demonstrating
why Facebook Inc.’s monopoly position is harmful to consumers, why it
potentially already constitutes an abuse of dominance, and why the law
should intervene to remedy the situation in which we currently find
ourselves.
To offer an answer to these questions—i.e., survey what the costs
of using Facebook currently are—let us take a brief look at the possible
future I have in mind. What could “the world of fifty (interoperable)
facebooks” look like?
B. The World of Fifty Facebooks—A First Glance
In the world I envision, many corporations would compete in the
facebooks market. They would offer services consisting of the
functionalities described above: allowing users to connect with other
people; message them; coordinate conduct; and create, share, and
consume content. Most importantly, they would all allow the consumers
to connect with the entire network of the facebooks’ users, just like
people using different mobile phone providers can call and text one
another. They would share the common identification system for users,
just like the telephone companies all “recognize” each other’s phone
numbers, and would not discriminate against users of other platforms
when access to their users is concerned.
In this world, you could be a user of A-Book (showing no ads but
charging a subscription fee), I could be a user of B-Book (showing ads,
but based on my chosen preferences, not based on data collected
without my understanding), and still, we would be able to find each
other in the search bar, add each other as friends, send messages to each
other, invite each other to events or groups, see each other’s content,
and have our content seen by one another. The user experience, though
not necessary, could remain similar across platforms. For example, we
could still see the aggregated content in the newsfeed, events and
groups in a side tab, and a search bar on top. Or it could be different,
whatever the innovators propose and consumers choose. Maybe some
users prefer a social media provider with no newsfeed, but something
else. The difference would be such that each of us will be able to choose
the facebook provider whose services we want to receive, freely migrate

PALKA (DO NOT DELETE)

1210

4/8/2021 10:51 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1193

between providers, and benefit from the competition between the
providers. What matters is that consumers would be able to not only
choose the functionalities they like but also the contract terms they
prefer. What alternative business models are possible?
First, consider a subscription fee. A new facebook provider could
offer access to the platform and the network in exchange for monthly
payments while refraining from collecting more data than necessary to
provide the service, remaining ad-free, and giving users greater control
over the newsfeed algorithm. In the “tech sector,” we already pay to
stream music and videos, for access to newspapers, etc. Why wouldn’t
some people choose to pay for the fundamental medium of
communication, if that payment allowed them to avoid data collection
and the behavioral and cognitive costs?
How much would it cost? Of course, this would depend. We can
make some (very) rough estimates, however, based on publicly
available data. Facebook Inc.’s revenue for the fourth quarter of 2019
in the US and Canada was $10.24 billion, out of which $10.02 billion (98
percent) came from advertising,55 with 248 million monthly active
users.56 Hence, on average, a user in the US and Canada generated
revenue equal to $13.70 a month. During the same period, the
company’s global revenue was $21.08 billion, with 2,498 billion
monthly active users.57 This amounts to a monthly average revenue of
$2.84 per user worldwide.58
For comparison, a monthly Netflix subscription in the US ranges
between $8.99 and $17.99,59 while Spotify costs $9.99,60 and Amazon
Prime $12.99.61 A $12 subscription fee for a facebook does not seem in
any way excessive. Especially if, in exchange, data collection ceases, and
the risks of cognitive and behavioral harms decline.

55 See Facebook Investor Relations, Facebook Q4 2019 Results, at 9–10,
https://s21.q4cdn.com/399680738/files/doc_financials/2019/q4/Q4-2019-EarningsPresentation-_final.pdf.
56 Id. at 3.
57 Id. at 3–4, 8.
58 Id. In this sense, Northern American users are unsurprisingly “subsidizing” users
in less developed countries. The types of harms suffered by these users are similar,
however, and potentially more serious, given less accessible mental healthcare and/or
less strict data (privacy) laws.
59 See Choose The Plan That’s Right For You, NETFLIX, https://www.netflix.com/
signup/planform (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
60 See Pick Your Premium, SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/us/premium (last
visited Jan. 11, 2021).
61 See Try Prime, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/amazonprime (last visited
Jan. 11, 2021).
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Further, unlike Netflix and Spotify, Facebook Inc. does not pay
licenses to copyright holders and/or content producers. Unlike Amazon
Prime, it does not pay for the large logistical operation of two-day
delivery. Its costs are lower. Of course, Facebook Inc. needs to finance
its operations (data storage, software development, secure servers,
etc.), but at least a part of Facebook Inc.’s current business costs are the
costs of the data-heavy, ad-based business model. In a world of no ads
and no data analytics, the cost of running the business would go down
as well.
Another possible business model could rely on less targeted
advertising. Instead of having data collected about them, users could be
required to indicate a certain number of categories of products they are
interested in or provide certain “static” types of information, like
hobbies, age, type of job, etc. The service provider could then display
“generic” advertisements aimed at a particular kind of audience. Such a
model would not automatically remove some types of costs, like the risk
of behavioral manipulation, but would decrease other costs, like the risk
of addiction or a data breach. Whether such a model would generate
enough revenue to keep the service “free” is an empirical question that
nobody can answer, precisely because of Facebook Inc.’s current
dominance. Nevertheless, in the world of fifty facebooks, this could be
tested.
Yet another option is to leave things roughly as they are but
compensate users for their labor, content, and activity. For the majority
of users, this would not be a particularly significant payment, but for
others hoping to attract the attention of millions, the payments could be
significant. Nevertheless, even the small amounts could constitute the
consumer surplus; there is no reason why the monopolist should be in
a position to keep all of it.
Moreover, once companies operating facebooks are legally
required to allow other companies access to their network and
platforms, products serving as add-ons (complementary services) and
not merely substitutes, could emerge. For example, YourFeed Inc. could
offer to curate content displayed on your facebook’s newsfeed. A-Book
could offer their own proprietary algorithm to determine what content
you see but also enable other companies to perform that function for the
user—and it would be up to the user to choose. Or GroupHost Inc. could
offer a service hosting interest groups (just like Facebook Groups now),
recommend those that match your interests, or think of new ways to
facilitate communication, and consumers would be able to find those
groups in the search bar of the facebook they use. Or HappyBday Inc.
could offer various ways to send greetings to your friends celebrating
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birthdays about which you learn from your facebook as well.
Possibilities are infinite. Of course, each of these services would need to
make money somehow, through ads, charging a subscription fee, or in
yet another way.
Why would we want to do that, one may ask, if Facebook is free?
Why bother with new regulations? Can antitrust really be helpful here,
since even if we accept Facebook Inc. has the dominant position in the
facebook(s) market, it is hard to demonstrate any abuse if the price is
zero? The answer is Facebook is not free, the price is not zero, and
Facebook Inc.’s conduct harms competition and consumers by
providing lower quality than possible, charging higher prices than
optimal, and stifling innovation.
Let us see how.
III. THE COSTS OF USING FACEBOOK TODAY
This Part analyzes why exactly using Facebook Inc.’s services is not
“free.” I go beyond the conventional wisdom that users pay for access
with their “data and attention,”62 and outline exactly what economic and
non-economic harms users incur. These harms include (i) cognitive
harms (emotional manipulation and risks for mental health), (ii)
behavioral harms (unwanted purchases, wasted time, risk of addiction),
(iii) privacy/security harms (risk of a data breach), and (iv) Facebook
Inc.’s freeriding on users’ creative content and labor. I demonstrate how
many of these harms are contingent upon Facebook Inc.’s business
model, and how many of these harms could be avoided in a world where
users can actually choose the conditions of access and service. Two
caveats are due.
First, I conceptualize the “harms” inflicted by Facebook Inc. as
cost/price/quality to enable discussion internal to individualist,
market-logic-oriented discussions in economic law. This, I want to be
clear, is not to disregard other normative theories of why what
Facebook Inc. does is “bad.” Many other accounts, principally opposed
to the neoliberal market logic, are possible. Such accounts would focus
on the protection of “dignity” or “autonomy” of persons,63 or even refute
the individualistic approaches to data harms altogether, focusing rather

62

See Ghosh, supra note 4.
This way of approaching the problem is typical for European law and technology
scholars. See, e.g., MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW
(2015); ROGER BROWNSWORD, RIGHTS, REGULATION AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION
(2008).
63
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on the relational and societal impacts.64 I welcome these accounts. My
aim, however, is to show that even within the market logic, the
monopolistic behavior of Facebook Inc. needs to be evaluated
negatively.
Second, I firmly believe that not all “data-related” harms should be
conceptualized as “privacy” harms.65 There is a tendency to treat all
instances of data collection, analysis, sharing, and usage as “privacy”
problems. This tendency is understandable given that, historically,
“privacy” has been the category employed to consider limiting who can
do what with whose information, and this approach has clarified and
enriched how we view some negative aspects of the data economy.66
But treating all data-related harms as problems of “privacy” prevents us
from seeing other harms stemming from data management. In many
ways, Facebook Inc. does respect and protect users’ privacy. We have
significant control over who can see what information we share, and we
are not afraid that Mark Zuckerberg will call our friends and tell them
embarrassing facts about us. Facebook Inc. does not use data to
“disclose” secrets of our lives. It uses data to squeeze money out of us.
And this begs for a different conceptual framework.
A. Data-Fueled, Ad- and Engagement-Driven Business Model
One needs to distinguish the analysis of Facebook as a service,
looking at what it does, and Facebook Inc.’s business model, looking at
how the company makes money. The two are not necessarily linked but
the user experience is largely shaped by the latter. To understand the
costs to consumers and how they could be avoided, one must closely
scrutinize incentives inherent to the current business model and
consequences for the corporation’s behavior.
Conventional wisdom is that Facebook Inc., albeit “free” in
monetary terms, offers its service to consumers in exchange for their
“data” and/or “attention.”67 This appears to be a two-party, mutual

64 See Salome Viljoen, Democratic Data: A Relational Theory for Data Governance
(2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3727562.
65 See Przemysław Pałka, Data Management Law for the 2020s: The Lost Origins and
the New Needs, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 559, 627–30 (2020).
66 Id. For some marvelous takes on the social role of privacy and theories of privacy
harms, see Lisa M. Austin, Privacy and Private Law: The Dilemma of Justification, 55
MCGILL L.J. 165 (2010); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013);
Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1039 (2018);
Daniel J. Solove, I’ve Got Nothing to Hide and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 745 (2007).
67 See Ghosh, supra note 4.
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transaction: Facebook Inc. provides an interactive facebook, while you
provide your data and your attention. This statement is misleading,
even if partly true. Indeed, Facebook Inc. collects information about its
users, and, as we have heard many times by now, “data is the new oil.”68
But Facebook Inc. cannot pay taxes on users’ data nor treat data as
currency when paying employee salaries or shareholder dividends.
Facebook Inc. needs money—real money.
Mark Zuckerberg himself offered another take on Facebook Inc.’s
business model in a now-famous exchange with Senator Orrin Hatch
during the April 2018 Congressional hearings.69 When Hatch asked,
“[H]ow do you sustain a business model in which users don’t pay for
your service?” Zuckerberg answered, “Senator, we run ads.”70
Zuckerberg’s answer, though it caused laughter in the chamber and
sparked mockery online, was not entirely accurate. Many outlets run
ads, from radio to newspapers to TV channels, and yet none of these
outlets have been accused of spying on customers,71 experimenting on
them,72 or enabling Russia to meddle in the American election.73 Only a
few of them are “free,” and none of them generate such high profits as
Facebook Inc. does. There must be something more.
In reality, Facebook Inc.’s business model is to run data-driven,
personalized, targeted advertisements in an environment designed to
have users spend a significant amount of time engaging with content on
the platform.74 The reason Facebook Inc. collects data about individual
users is not only to learn about their preferences and simply “match”
ads with these preferences but also to infer new knowledge about other
users, constantly refine the effectiveness of its ad-delivery system, and
ensure that users spend as much time as possible on the platform.75
Facebook Inc.’s revenue increases with the number of advertisements it
can display, which, in turn, is a function of how many users Facebook
has, how much time they spend using the platform, and how effective
advertisers believe the ads to be.
68

For the history of the slogan and its critique, see James Bridle, Opinion: Data Isn’t
The New Oil—It’s The New Nuclear Power, TED (July 17, 2018), https://ideas.ted.com/
opinion-data-isnt-the-new-oil-its-the-new-nuclear-power.
69 See Transcript of Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Hearing, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/10/transcript-ofmark-zuckerbergs-senate-hearing.
70 Id.
71 See ZUBOFF, supra note 9.
72 See infra Section III.B.1.
73 The direct cause of these hearings was the Cambridge Analytica scandal. See
Confessore, supra note 45.
74 See BALKIN, supra note 14.
75 See LANIER, supra note 8.
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In this business model, Facebook Inc. has an incentive to:
1. encourage users to spend as much time as possible on
the platform;
2. have users share as much content and engage with as
much content (including ads) as possible;
3. collect and analyze the data about the engagement,
also in a “provoked” manner, when Facebook Inc. not
only observes how you react to a certain type of
content but also periodically tests its hypotheses.
This “engaged time spent on the platform” constitutes both an
opportunity to sell more ads and an opportunity to constantly refine the
ad-delivery system by testing new techniques, generating new
knowledge about how to increase users’ time on Facebook and their
chances of clicking on the ads. Finally, it is in Facebook Inc.’s direct
interest to demonstrate that ads run on its platform lead to actual
purchases, even if these purchases are less reflective of actual consumer
preferences and more reflective of the effectiveness of “targeted sales”
techniques.76
A more accurate restatement of the transactional relationship
between Facebook Inc. and its individual users would be the following:
We provide you “an interactive facebook,” with all its functionalities and
access to an immense network of people you can communicate with. In
exchange, you agree that (i) we will collect information about all your
connections and your behavior on our platform and beyond;77 (ii) we
will use this information to tailor your experience in such a way that you
spend as much time on our platform as possible so that we can collect
even more information; and (iii) we will show you advertisements,
based on data we collected about you and data we inferred about you
from the large databases we have, in such a way that you click on as
many as possible, and buy as much as possible.
In this sense, logging into the facebook provided by Facebook Inc.
is a little bit like walking into a casino. Of course, you will derive some
utility from being here, but you know that the casino is smarter than you
and the environment is designed to squeeze money out of you, but you
still accept that, with all the consequences for which we are not liable.78

76

See infra Section III.B.2.
See Geoffrey A. Fowler, Facebook Will Now Show You Exactly How It Stalks You—
Even When You’re Not Using Facebook, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/28/off-facebook-activitypage.
78 See Facebook Terms, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php (especially
Section 4.3, “Additional Provisions: Limits on Liability”).
77
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Note how this business model is neither a necessary nor “natural”
way of financing the service Facebook Inc. provides. It could give users
the same functionalities and access to the same network without
collecting so much data about them, without showing them ads, and
without trying to convince them to spend even more time on the
platform. It could simply charge a subscription fee.
For the sake of the argument, let us imagine that a competitor—
Greenbook Inc.—emerges and promises to collect no more data about
users than strictly necessary to provide the service, show no ads, and
instead charges users $12 a month. Let us imagine that Facebook Inc. is
legally required to allow Greenbook to be interoperable with its
network and platform, suddenly creating a choice for consumers. They
can obtain access to the same, huge network of people, and many neat
functionalities, either for $12 a month or for “free” with Facebook Inc.
Why would anyone choose to switch? The simplest answer would be
that it is rational if the benefits exceed the costs.
B. Harms to Consumers: Higher “Prices” and Lower Quality
1. Cognitive Costs: Emotional Manipulation, Mental Health
Problems
Facebook Inc. inflicts cognitive costs on consumers by intentionally
and unintentionally making them experience thoughts and emotions
that, given a choice, they would prefer not to experience, or for which,
in a competitive market, they would prefer to be compensated. These
cognitive costs include, among others, emotional manipulation and
mental health problems.
As far back as 2012, Facebook Inc. conducted an experiment on
689,003 of its users aimed at testing whether the platform can influence
what emotions its users experience based on what content they are
being displayed.79 The authors of the study, published in 2014, wrote
that,
[e]motional states can be transferred to others via emotional
contagion, leading people to experience the same emotions
without their awareness. . . . In an experiment with people
who use Facebook, we test whether emotional contagion
occurs outside of in-person interaction between individuals
by reducing the amount of emotional content in the News

79 Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory & Jeffrey T. Hancock, Experimental Evidence
of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 8788, 8788 (July 22, 2014), https://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/
8788; see also Kilovaty, supra note 9.
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Feed. When positive expressions were reduced, people
produced fewer positive posts and more negative posts; when
negative expressions were reduced, the opposite pattern
occurred. These results indicate that emotions expressed by
others on Facebook influence our own emotions, constituting
experimental evidence for massive-scale contagion via social
networks.80
This experiment has been widely criticized and led to media
uproar,81 in part because Facebook Inc. did not receive the participants’
informed consent, nor did it compensate the users. It was one of many
similar experiments that Facebook Inc. conducted.82 The company later
issued an apology, noting, however, that it had a right to behave in this
way under its Terms of Service.83 In the aftermath of the scandal,
Facebook Inc. stopped publishing scientific papers about its
experiments; however, no evidence suggests that it stopped conducting
such tests. In other words, Facebook Inc. may still be conducting
experiments, believing it has the right to do so, but simply not informing
the public.
Why would Facebook Inc. conduct such experiments? In addition
to researchers’ curiosity, there are good business reasons (contingent
upon the business model) to be able to manipulate users’ emotions.
First, research suggests that the emotions we experience influence
our engagement with content, including with ads. In particular, positive
emotions lead to people sharing content more often, while negative
emotions increase clicks on pages, including ads.84 Put simply, the
ability to influence users’ emotions increases advertising campaigns’
effectiveness. Second, the ability to influence users’ emotions leads to
more data being generated. Jaron Lanier suggests that negative
80

See Kramer, supra note 79, at 8788.
See Vindu Goel, Facebook Tinkers With Users’ Emotions in News Feed Experiment,
Stirring Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/
technology/facebook-tinkers-with-users-emotions-in-news-feed-experiment-stirringoutcry.html.
82 For an overview of all experiments that Facebook conducted on its users that
observers were able to document, see Anya Zhukova, Facebook’s Fascinating (and
Disturbing) History of Secret Experiments, MAKE USE OF (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/facebook-secret-experiments/.
83 See Samuel Gibbs, Facebook Apologises for Psychological Experiments on Users,
GUARDIAN, (July 2, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/02/
facebook-apologises-psychological-experiments-on-users.
84 See Dan Baum, How Emotion Influences Buying Behavior (And Marketers Can Use
it), IMPACT (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.impactplus.com/blog/emotion-influencebuying-behavior; Peter Noel Murray, How Emotions Influence What We Buy, PSYCH. TODAY
(Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/inside-the-consumermind/201302/how-emotions-influence-what-we-buy.
81
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emotions like fear, anger, and envy lead people to become more engaged
and react more to content than do positive emotions.85 Third, this ability
can help Facebook Inc. influence users to spend more time on the
platform.86
Facebook Inc. is in the business of marketing knowledge creation.
Facebook Inc. collects raw data, creates cognitive knowledge about how
people behave, and monopolizes the use of that knowledge in sales. This
is how the company makes money.
Note that if Facebook Inc. was a research institution, it would need
not only to abide by codes of ethics and obtain users’ informed consent
for participation in such experiments87 but it would also need—most
probably—to compensate the users for the time spent and/or negative
emotional impact. Hence, hidden experiments on users’ emotions and
behavior, conducted without compensation, constitute a higher price
than consumers could otherwise be paying.
Moreover, several studies suggest that Facebook and other social
media platforms increase the chance of experiencing psychological
problems, including depression88 and feelings of loneliness.89 Arguably,
instilling such emotions in users need not be Facebook Inc.’s goal, but it
does constitute an unintended and tolerated negative consequence that,
in a competitive market, could be avoided. Of course, some level of
negative psychological impacts—stemming from looking at “cool lives”
of our “friends,” or looking at one’s phone instead of interacting with
others in person, etc.—will always occur.90 To minimize such an effect,
however, a company should be able to tell the user, “Hey, I think you
spent enough time here today.” And Facebook Inc. will never do that.
Hence, the negative emotions experienced by Facebook’s users as a side

85

See LANIER, supra note 8.
Id.
87 Any researcher conducting experiments on human subjects knows that getting an
ethical committee approval ex ante is a necessary condition for such an experiment to
be justifiable. For a discussion of various novel difficulties regarding informed consent
in the current age, see contributions in BEYOND AUTONOMY: LIMITS AND ALTERNATIVES TO
INFORMED CONSENT IN RESEARCH ETHICS AND LAW (David G. Kirchhoffer & Bernadette J.
Richards eds., 2019).
88 See Denis Campbell, Depression in Girls Linked to Higher Use of Social Media,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/jan/04/
depression-in-girls-linked-to-higher-use-of-social-media.
89 See generally Melissa G. Hunt et al., No More FOMO: Limiting Social Media
Decreases Loneliness and Depression, 37 J. SOC. CLINIC. PSYCH. 751 (2018).
90 Helmut Appel, Alexander L. Gerlach & Jan Crusius, The Interplay Between
Facebook Use, Social Comparison, Envy, and Depression, 9 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCH. 44,
44–49 (2016).
86
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effect of using the platform constitute a lower quality of the product that
could occur in a competitive market.
Now let us imagine how in a competitive market, where Greenbook
Inc. offers the same service that is financed through a subscription fee,
the cognitive costs could be avoided. As Greenbook Inc.’s revenue would
not depend on targeted ads, the incentives to collect (and generate) data
about the users’ behavior (including tracking them on other sites)
would significantly decrease. There would be no reason for Greenbook
Inc. to want to manipulate users’ emotions, as it would not benefit from
learning how they respond to content when they are angry, happy, or
depressed. Greenbook Inc. just wants users to keep paying the
subscription fee. As many users will want to retain access to the
network of other facebooks’ customers, Greenbook Inc. will want to
ensure that its customers enjoy their service more than that of the
competitors. And in light of growing psychological research about the
negative consequences of Facebook Inc.’s business model, Greenbook
Inc. could try to convince people that its platform is just much healthier
for users’ minds. It could, for example, give users an opportunity to
design their own algorithms for content curation, or offer various modes
like “happy mode” or “relax mode,” where the newsfeeds would be filled
with content instilling positive emotional reactions. Of course, to be
able to do so, it would need some feedback as well. The fundamental
difference, however, would be the character of the relationship between
the provider and the users. Instead of spying on the latter and treating
them as guinea pigs, the former would see them as partners. It could
collect feedback in a manner designed to ensure anonymity, just like
social scientists do. It could be transparent about the ways it filters
content. But most importantly, Greenbook Inc. would have an incentive
to truly care about its users’ psychological wellbeing, as opposed to
increasing their “engagement” at a high cognitive cost.
Would all the psychological harms go away? Of course not. There
is no way to make sure that your friend does not share a photo that
triggers you or makes you unhappy. There will always be situations
when the user gets slightly depressed by looking at photos of her friends
relaxing on the beach, or playing with their babies, or doing anything
else. Some of the psychological harms that users of facebooks suffer
stem not from the service’s design but from a much broader set of
problems present in our societies. But the fundamental difference
between Facebook Inc. and Greenbook Inc. is that the latter would not
only not benefit from you experiencing the negative emotions but would
also have an incentive to make sure that if you do not want to experience
them you have a way to do so. For example, you indicate on Greenbook,
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“No vacations/baby/career photos today.” You could tell Greenbook,
“No political content today.” Such an approach would engrain in the
company’s business model a partnership between users and the
company, wherein the company has an interest in users’ psychological
wellbeing.91
As of today, Facebook Inc. does not see you this way. This is
because being able to influence the way you feel (even if this means
negative emotions) helps Facebook Inc. influence the way you behave.
2. Behavioral Costs: Behavioral Manipulation, Addiction,
Wasted Time
Facebook Inc. inflicts behavioral costs on its consumers by
intentionally and unintentionally making them engage in conduct that,
given a choice, they would prefer not to engage in or for which, in a
competitive market, they would prefer to be compensated. This
includes both on-the-spot purchases caused by ads displayed by
Facebook Inc. and spending more time on the platform than users would
prefer to, including the possibility of addiction.92 Note that these costs
are related to and, to a certain extent, depend upon the cognitive costs.
As Facebook Inc.’s profits stem from advertising, it has an indirect
incentive to prove that advertising through its channels increases sales.
A good faith way of proving this increase is documenting actual sales
increases (as opposed to lying about it to the advertisers, which is a
separate problem). One might wonder, however, if there is anything
inherently wrong with increasing sales through effective advertising.
From the microeconomic perspective, advertisements could be
deemed to serve three functions. They (i) spread information; (ii) shape
preferences; and (iii) influence on-the-spot behavior. Within the
classical law and economics imaginary, the first function is good,93 the
second is arguably neutral,94 and the third is potentially negative; for
example, if it makes consumers act against their actual preferences.95
How is this last instance possible? Consider an example.
91 For a detailed explanation of why this is a paramount societal problem, and survey
of ways achieve it, see Thomas E. Kadri, Networks of Empathy, 2020 UTAH L. REV. 1075,
1083–93 (2020).
92 See Anindita Chakraborty, Facebook Addiction: An Emerging Problem, 11 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 7 (2016).
93 The “perfect information” assumption is a part of the “perfectly competitive
markets” view. See Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815,
830–33 (2019).
94 Assuming that others can compete, NGOs can run their own campaigns,
journalists can investigate, etc.
95 See Mik, supra note 20, at 14–16.
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Imagine you are driving home after a long day and plan to cook fish
with vegetables for dinner, as you have these ingredients in the fridge,
and your doctor told you to cut out meat and salt. Suddenly the music
on the radio stops and commercials begin. You hear some fun music,
people laughing, a sound of a fizzy drink being poured onto ice cubes,
and then a pleasant voice says “Had a rough day? Need to regenerate?
Why wait? Come to B-Burger for our dinner special of a quarter
pounder with cheese, large fries, and a coke for $9.99.” “Ok, that’s a good
deal,” you think, and suddenly you can feel the emptiness of your
stomach and saliva gathering in your mouth. You take a turn and, ten
minutes later, find yourself munching through a burger. The burger is
amazing for a while until you get back home and look at those poor
veggies, which will go bad any day now, remembering that you really
wanted to get healthier and realizing you did something you did not
want to do. You got tricked by an ad.96 Of course, one can argue that
what you actually did was maximize your short-term preference, no
matter how short it was. But such an account has perfect explanatory
power with zero predictive power—taken to the extreme, such a view
would force us to believe that every choice a consumer makes, no matter
how quickly she comes to regret it, is aligned with her preferences. We
need to be able to distinguish between people’s stable preferences and
their wants triggered in moments of vulnerability created by hunger,
exhaustion, or stress.97
This phenomenon has been theorized by economists under various
labels, including “hyperbolic discounting” and “time inconsistency.”98
Ramsi Woodcock argues that ads steering consumer behavior in this
96 One term to describe such an occurrence is a “sludge.” For a discussion on how to
assess interventions that make a person undertake an action she would prefer not to
undertake before doing so, and regrets after doing so, see CASS SUNSTEIN, ON FREEDOM
(2019).
97 An interesting discussion about the concept of “vulnerability” of consumers is
currently taking place in the European academia. EU consumer law used to treat
vulnerability as a static quality of certain kinds of consumers (children, the elderly,
people with mental health problems, etc.). But in a world where we can see ads and act
on them anytime, everyone is potentially vulnerable every now and then. I might be
generally knowledgeable about the market, I might even be an expert, but when I am
tired and stressed at the end of the day, I might make choices irrational even by my own
standards. Hence, the idea here is to reconceptualize vulnerability as dynamic state in
which every consumer can sometimes find herself in. For a discussion of this problem,
as well as the potential implications for the consumer protection law, see N. Helberger,
et al., EU Consumer Protection 2.0: Surveillance, Consent and the Vulnerable Consumer.
Regaining Citizen Agency in the Information Economy, EUR. CONSUMER ORG., 12–20 (Sept.
30, 2020) (manuscript with the author, available at https://www.beuc.eu).
98 See Matthew O. Jackson & Leeat Yariv, Collective Dynamic Choice: The Necessity of
Time Inconsistency, 7 AM. ECON. J. MICRO. 150 (2015); Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review
of the Basic Economics, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 59 (2007).
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way (given, among others, the possibility of on-the-spot purchases
online) is potentially illegal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.99 In
brief, this argument holds that with easy access to online information
that ensures consumers can find what they really want, the social
function of ads tends to be more and more about preference and
behavioral manipulation.100 In this context, note how Facebook Inc.—
with its ability to reach you anytime, in any moment of vulnerability,
maybe even caused by the platform itself, based on all the data it has
about you and millions of others—can throw at you the “fast food dinner
ad” on steroids. Commercials are not only designed to be convincing in
themselves (like the old radio stuff) but also tailored specifically for you.
All this in the environment where you are just two clicks away from
ordering and paying for the product online.
Because consumers have no choice but to accept targeted
advertising on Facebook, this constitutes a higher price for users.
Moreover, as suggested above, Facebook Inc. has incentives to have its
users spend as much time on the platform as possible.101 Acting upon
that incentive—through the design of the interface/newsfeed’s
algorithms—might lead consumers to spend more time on the platform
than they would otherwise choose. As a result, consumers receive a
lower quality service. Hence, service design increasing the engagement
above the levels factually desired by the users constitutes a lower
quality of the service. Finally, the unintended behavioral consequence
of Facebook Inc.’s activity might be social media addiction as
demonstrated by researchers.102
How would Greenbook diminish these costs? First, when it comes
to ads, the gain is rather evident—there would be no ads. One unwanted
purchase that you avoid every month renders the subscription cost
worthwhile, even absent any other gains. Second, when it comes to time
spent on the platform and the risk of addiction, there is no incentive on
Greenbook Inc.’s part to have you spend as much time as possible on the
99

See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Obsolescence of Advertising in the Information Age,
127 YALE L.J. 2270, 2308 (2018) (“Persuasive advertising excludes competitors from the
market for the advertised product, by making consumers prefer the advertised product
over those of competitors. This makes a monopolization claim under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, which attacks conduct that excludes competitors from markets, the
appropriate vehicle for challenging advertising on antitrust grounds. To prevail on a
monopolization claim under section 2, a plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) has
engaged in an illegal form of exclusionary conduct and (2) enjoys monopoly power in
the market from which the defendant has excluded competitors.”)
100 Id. at 2299.
101 See BALKIN, supra note 14.
102 See Anindita Chakraborty, Facebook Addiction: An Emerging Problem, 11 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 7 (2016).
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platform. Greenbook Inc. wants you to keep paying the subscription fee.
Once the money comes in, Greenbook Inc. is indifferent as to whether
you spend five or sixty hours using it a month. Because Greenbook Inc.
does not incur costs when you limit your engagement, it could
proactively help you spend less time on the platform. For example, it
could ask you how much time you wish to spend there and display a red
pop-up when your daily/weekly limit is exceeded. For Facebook Inc.,
that is a costly feature to have. For Greenbook Inc., it might be a profitgenerating feature, as more people—generally unhappy with wasting
time on social media but wishing to remain a part of the network—
would choose it over the competitors.
Will this solve the problems of addiction and wasting time? Again,
not entirely. As with every addiction, there are reasons beyond the
features of the product that lead people to overuse it. People might go
to their facebook to numb their minds, to scroll, etc.; however, there is a
difference between overusing something because we enjoy it (in the
short term) and overusing it because it is made up of addictive
components.103 Imagine that it is possible to produce tobacco or alcohol
that does not cause physiological addiction. Would that mean that
people stop using it? No, because some people like it. Would it mean
that no one would overuse it? Again, no, because some people might like
it so much that even absent the addiction they would still consume it in
excess. But if someone wanted to stop, quitting would be so much
easier. The difference between cigarettes and alcohol on the one hand
and facebooks on the other is that we are not able to produce the former
in a less addictive form, whereas we absolutely can with the latter. The
reason is that unlike with substances like cigarettes or alcohol, the
features of the facebook product are not the same ones that make it
addictive—the features of the business model are. And the business
model could be different.
In these two subsections, we analyzed how a different business
model could disincentivize facebooks operators from using data for
nefarious purposes. But the problem with Facebook Inc. is not just the
abuse of data—it is also privacy and security itself. The mere
availability of data about our lives stored somewhere is potentially
costly. Let us see how that could be avoided.

103 For specialized references to the literature suggesting that online platforms are
currently designed to addict, see Rosenquist & Scott Morton, supra note 12, at 2 (“The
stimuli produced by digital platforms are not physical substances consumed by the body
such as recreational and prescribed drugs, however, their effects on the brain follow the
same common pathway of reward through the nucleus accumbens, which in turn
regulates pathways of addiction.”).
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3. Privacy (as Security) Costs: Opportunity Makes the Thief
Facebook Inc. imposes “privacy as security” costs on its users by
amassing unnecessary (from the technical point of view) data, capable
of being stolen by hackers. This is a potential cost that users will bear if
the breach occurs, potentiality being subject to uncertainty.104
As noted at the beginning of this subsection, “privacy” tends to be
treated as an “umbrella” category for all the data-related harms.
Traditionally, at least within American privacy torts jurisprudence,
privacy has been associated with disclosure of information about one’s
private life against the will of the person whom this information
concerns.105 In the current socio-technological reality, there are two
ways in which this type of “disclosure” by Facebook Inc. can occur: (i)
intentional sharing of personally indefinable information by the
company and (ii) a security breach (data leak). Leaving the discussions
about the former to legal scholars interested in the nitty-gritty of the
privacy law theories, I would like to focus on the latter, significant from
in terms of this paper’s argument.
Facebook Inc. has been involved with scandals concerning hacking
and data leaks/breaches when third parties illegally obtained access to
users’ data.106 There are many reasons why these types of breaches are
harmful to consumers,107 including the fact that hackers, unlike
Facebook Inc., are not in a business relationship with users and have no
market (or other) incentives against publicly sharing this data or using
it to blackmail the users.108
Hence, the fact that Facebook Inc. chooses to construct its business
model around extensive data collection about the users, given the risk
of hacking, lowers the quality of service provided to users, constituting
a higher price that consumers will (potentially) have to pay if or when a
breach materializes. Conversely, in a competitive market, where other
104 It is also a risk that users incur, given the impossibility of knowing the probability.
For the distinction, see FRANK KNIGHT, RISK UNCERTAINTY & PROFIT (1921).
105 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (enumerating four
types of privacy torts: “1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs; 2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; 3.
Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; 4. Appropriation, for
the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness”); Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
106 See Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes Accounts of 50
Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/
technology/facebook-hack-data-breach.html.
107 See Kilovaty, supra note 10, at 1184.
108 For an argument that a legal obligation of this sort should exist between the users
and the platforms, see Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment,
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016).
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facebook providers could adopt different business models, the
protection of users’ privacy and security could stem from their less dataheavy conduct. More competition in the facebooks market would
benefit consumer privacy and data security.
Of course, Greenbook Inc. would still store some data—potentially
a great amount of it. In a way, a facebook is about storing and sharing
information. Nevertheless, the amount and the kind of data stored
would differ. As of now, Facebook Inc. has an incentive to store not only
the data you provide (photos, posts, live events, friendships, occupation,
etc.) but also data about your behavior on-platform and off-platform.
The amount of time you spent there, what articles you click, how you
react to all the posts, what time of a day you visit what websites—all this
information can be and is being monetized. For Greenbook Inc., no such
incentive exists. Simply put, Greenbook would collect much fewer data
about you than Facebook does, even if you were using it in exactly the
same way. This lowers the potential costs that occur when a hack
happens—the Cambridge Analytics scandal, by definition, would have
no factual chance of occurring on Greenbook.
4. Free Riding on Users’ Intellectual Property and Labor
Facebook Inc. harms users by free riding on their creative content,
including their copyright-protected content and their labor, understood
as data creation and service improvement.109 In a competitive market,
users would choose to be compensated for the value they provide to the
platform.
One of the reasons Facebook is such an appealing platform to spend
time on is that it allows users to engage with creative content. The
pictures you upload, the funny or exciting posts you write, or the
comments you scribble are not only a way for you to express yourself,
for others to stay in touch with you, but also for Facebook Inc. to retain
its high user base that “enjoys” all this content.
As some of the content that people upload is copyright protected,
Facebook Inc. needs a license to display it legally. Any future facebook
provider willing to allow users to make their photos and posts available
to the public will need some license from a user, assuming the content
passes the threshold of copyright protection.110 Specifically, the
provider will need a license to copy, display, and make the content
109

See POSNER & WEYL, supra note 11, at 207–09.
In this case, the most important test is “originality.” For an overview of the ways
various jurisdictions define this concept, see Elizabeth F. Judge & Daniel Gervais, Of Silos
and Constellations: Comparing Notions of Originality in Copyright Law,
27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 375 (2009).
110
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available to other users, depending on how the platform uses the
content.111
The business conditions of this license, however, are not in any way
predetermined. Specifically, the fact that the license is royalty-free—
users do not get paid, even if millions see their posts—is Facebook Inc.’s
business decision, which is easy to force upon users because Facebook
Inc. is a monopolist. Nevertheless, these conditions constitute a cost. In
Facebook Inc.’s Terms of Service, we read:
The permissions you give us:
....
. . . Nothing in these Terms takes away the rights you have to
your own content. You are free to share your content with
anyone else, wherever you want.
However, to provide our services we need you to give us
some legal permissions (known as a ‘license’) to use this
content. This is solely for the purposes of providing and
improving our Products and services as described in Section 1
above.
Specifically, when you share, post, or upload content that is
covered by intellectual property rights on or in connection
with our Products, you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable,
sub-licensable, royalty-free, and worldwide license to host, use,
distribute, modify, run, copy, publicly perform or display,
translate, and create derivative works of your content
(consistent with your privacy and application settings).112
As you might notice by looking at the emphasized portions of the
texts, Facebook Inc.’s wording is misleading, and this contractual
provision is by no means the only possible one. Facebook Inc. claims
that they need a license to display your IP-created content, which is true.
To do so, however, Facebook Inc. does not need a royalty-free license. It
could agree to pay you a share of the profits it makes. Such sharing need
not be automatic; the provider could require a minimum number of
engagements with your content before paying you. But the fact that
Facebook Inc. does not allow you to participate in the profits from your
work at all means it is free riding off of your content.

111 See 17 U.S.C. § 106; U.S. Copyright Office, Making Available Study, COPYRIGHT.GOV,
https://www.copyright.gov/docs/making_available (last visited Apr. 8, 2021).
112 See Facebook Terms, supra note 50, at § 3 (emphasis added).
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Many other platforms that make a business of giving people access
to creative content (YouTube, Spotify, Netflix, etc.) do share profits with
the content creators.113 The difference is such that these creators are
often either represented by professional agents or have explicitly
transferred their copyright to producers—read, corporations—with
bargaining power sufficient to demand compensation.
Moreover, on top of the right to profit from users’ creative content
without remuneration, Facebook Inc. also benefits from free riding on
users’ labor.114 All the activities that users engage in—from tagging
their friends on photos to rating businesses or translations to reacting
to others’ posts—are sources of data that Facebook Inc. uses to train its
facial recognition, translation, and ad algorithms. This is not data that
Facebook Inc. collects about users. This is data that users produce for
Facebook Inc., for free.
Imagine I run a start-up company that creates various machinelearning-based tools. To train my algorithms, I need annotated data.115
Someone must tag it (indicate what is on the picture, or how to translate
a given word, or whether a news article contains a happy or sad story).
Imagine I ask you to spend two hours a week: (i) marking the faces of
people you know on photos I show you; (ii) correcting my translations;
and (iii) marking if the things I show you make you laugh, angry, sad, or
surprised. Through this labor of yours, combined with the work of
millions of other people, I can create robust, reliable, and profitable
instances of machine-learning-powered tools, or what is now commonly
referred to as “artificial intelligence.”116 You might agree to do this for
me, but you will ask for money. The laborer deserves her payment. And
yet, in the case of Facebook Inc., more than two billion laborers provide
this work for free.
Note that Facebook Inc. neither has to collect the data from users
to improve its services (it could just as well hire external contractors to
provide the data) nor keep all the profits to itself. This a business
decision made in an environment with no competitor offering payment
or a better deal for consumers. This is a decision a monopolist made to
impose costs on users and extract all the surplus. The lack of royalties
for your IP-protected content, from which Facebook Inc. benefits, and
113 James H. Richardson, The Spotify Paradox: How the Creation of a Compulsory
License Scheme for Streaming On-Demand Music Platforms Can Save the Music Industry,
22 UCLA ENTM’T L. REV. 46, 57–62 (2014).
114 Jamal Robinson, How Facebook Scales Machine Learning, MEDIUM (Feb 3, 2019),
https://medium.com/@jamal.robinson/how-facebook-scales-artificial-intelligencemachine-learning-693706ae296f; see also POSNER & WEYL, supra note 11, at 207–09.
115 See ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI 29–54 (2016).
116 See id. at 17–20.
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the lack of salary for the labor you provide by producing data it will use
to train its algorithms are a part of the price you are currently paying for
access to Facebook Inc.’s service.
Greenbook Inc.—or some other competitor—could choose to pay
users a share of their profits for the value of their content and labor, as
Spotify and YouTube do. Of course, this would not be a lot of money for
most people. Still, there is no reason why it should stay with the
monopolist.
To sum up, this Part explored exactly why using Facebook is not
“free” and analyzed the types of costs it imposes on consumers, going
beyond “data and attention” (cognitive, behavioral, and privacy-security
harms, as well as Facebook Inc.’s free riding on users’ content and
labor). This Part also tried to imagine how, in a competitive market,
consumers could, and would, either refuse to suffer those harms (by
choosing a different provider) or require compensation. In short, I
argued that interoperability in the market for facebooks is necessary to
increase competition and that competition is necessary to lower the
costs to consumers.
IV. TOWARD THE WORLD OF FIFTY FACEBOOKS
In this final Part, I sketch the possible ways of getting from where
we are today to the world of fifty facebooks. First, I take a closer look at
the concept of interoperability as used in the existing legal discourse,
survey the state of the art, and apply it to the problem of facebooks.
Second, I look at the role of regulation and antitrust enforcement in
facilitating the competitive market in facebooks, as well as preventing
certain types of abusive behavior by providers. Third, I survey several
commonplace objections to the interoperability of online platforms,
including innovation, privacy and security, property, and distributive
effects. Finally, I offer a brief reflection on the possibility of scaling up
the idea presented in this paper to other platforms.
A. Interoperability
The reader will have noticed that I have not defined
“interoperability” until now. I wanted the argument to proceed bottomup, from the single case study of Facebook Inc., and not top-down, from
some abstract definition of “interoperability.” In other words, I wanted
us first to imagine, in several ways, what the world of fifty facebooks
could look like and why it would be beneficial before getting into the
details of how it could work from the technical perspective. This is
because, at least from the perspective of this paper’s argument,
interoperability is a means to the end of higher consumer welfare, not a
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goal in itself.117 This is not to say that we should not aim for a more
interoperable internet as the goal118—on the contrary, I believe we
probably should;119 it is just not the argument I tried to advance in this
Article. Nevertheless, one should remember that numerous scholars
have explored, and several national and transnational reports have
taken up, the idea of interoperability in information technologies,
including the interoperability of platforms.120 Building on this work, let
us try to better define it and distinguish certain key concepts.
Put simply, products are interoperable if they can work together.
This means different things depending on the context. For example, if
you have an iPhone and a contract with AT&T, and I have a Samsung
phone and use T-Mobile, we can text and call one another; this means
that various phones and various telephone providers are horizontally
interoperable. If you can charge your headphones with the USB charger
you got when buying a hair trimmer, then the charger and the device are
vertically interoperable. On the contrary, Apple chargers and non-Apple
devices are not interoperable. Further, you can open a PDF file in dozens
of readers or access most websites with several web browsers because
the files and the software are interoperable. On the contrary, if you can
only listen to an audiobook you bought from Amazon using the Audible
app, this means that the file is not interoperable with other programs.

117 For an argument that we should generally treat interoperability as a means to an
end, not a goal valuable in itself, see Wolfgang Kerber & Heike Schweitzer,
Interoperability in the Digital Economy, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L.
39, 58 (2017).
118 For an argument that interoperability is valuable as goal in itself, see Cory
Doctorow, Interoperability: Fix the Internet, Not the Tech Companies, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (July 11, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/07/interoperability-fixinternet-not-tech-companies.
119 See infra Section IV.D.
120 See OPENING STANDARDS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTEROPERABILITY (Laura DeNardis
ed., 2011); JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF HIGHLY
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS (2012); Inge Graef, Mandating Portability and Interoperability in
Online Social Networks: Regulatory and Competition Law Issues in the European Union,
39 TELECOMM. POL’Y 502 (2015); Chris Riley, Unpacking Interoperability in Competition, 5
J. CYBER POL’Y 94 (2020); BRITISH COMPETITION & MARKETS AUTH., ONLINE PLATFORMS AND
DIGITAL ADVERTISING: MARKET STUDY FINAL REPORT (2020), https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/media/5efc57ed3a6f4023d242ed56/Final_report_1_July_2020_.pdf
(United Kingdom); JACQUES CRÉMER, YVES-ALEXANDRE DE MONTJOYE & HEIKE SCHWEITZER,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL ERA (2019),
https://cnnumerique.fr/files/uploads/2020/ra-cnnum-concurrence-web(1).pdf
(European Union); L’étude de cas sur l’interopérabilité des réseaux sociaux, CONSEIL
NATIONAL DU NUMÉRIQUE (July 2020), https://cnnumerique.fr/Interoperabilite_
Concurrence_Etude (France); THE STIGLER REPORT, supra note 12, at 113–18 (United
States).
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John Palfrey and Urs Gasser define interoperability, in the context
of information technologies, as “the ability to transfer and render useful
data and other information across systems, applications, or
components.”121 They nuance the definition by distinguishing four
layers of interoperability: technological, data, human, and
institutional.122 The lesson to be learned from their work is that
interoperability is much more than just passing a law or developing
technical standards. Concrete technical issues are a legion, and a lot of
possible ways of achieving the goals exist (including both private and
public interventions, and both unilateral and cooperative actions).123
Moreover, interoperability is as much about imagination and
willingness to change things as it is about technicalities. Or, in Palfrey
and Gasser’s words, “[t]he problems associated with interop are just as
much about culture as they are about technology.”124
Applying their insights to the question of facebooks’
interoperability, one will notice that, at least in theory, it could emerge
based on Facebook Inc.’s unilateral decisions. Especially where vertical
interoperability is concerned, there have always been many apps
running on Facebook.125 From the business perspective, Facebook Inc.
benefits from additional apps increasing its platform’s “utility” to users.
The trouble is that, as of today, Facebook Inc. retains full control over
who can offer services vertically interoperable with its platform and
under what conditions they may do so. Hence, it might disallow certain
apps once it considers them to be too competitive (as it did with Vine)126
or generally keep certain functionalities fully to itself (like content
filtering and moderation). Moreover, it has never voluntarily allowed
horizontal interoperability. Here is where we need to categorize
interoperability by kind based on the attitude of various concerned
actors.

121

PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 120, at 5.
Id. at 6.
123 Id. at 14–15.
124 Id. at 5.
125 One example are games developed by Zynga Inc., most notably Farmville. See
Demetrius Williams, The Rise and Fall of Zynga: A Cautionary Tale for Mobile Game
Developers, TRANSLATE MEDIA (June 7, 2017), https://www.translatemedia.com/
translation-blog/rise-fall-zynga-cautionary-tale-game-developers.
126 Adi Robertson, Mark Zuckerberg Personally Approved Cutting Off Vine’s FriendFinding Feature, VERGE (Dec. 8, 2018, 10:35 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/
12/5/18127202/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-vine-friends-api-block-parliamentdocuments.
122
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Cory Doctorow, understanding interoperability as “the technical
ability to plug one product or service into another product or service,”
distinguishes between indifferent, cooperative, and adversarial
interoperability.127 Indifferent interoperability occurs when one
company is not concerned with the actions of the other; cooperative
interoperability is when two parties actually cooperate to ensure the
interoperability (for instance, developers of apps for a new operating
system or cases for telephones).128 Adversarial interoperability, on the
other hand, occurs when one party makes its product work with another
without the permission, and often against the will, of the other product’s
producer.129 This is the case of Facebook Inc. Zuckerberg’s giant has no
wish to become interoperable with other services unless it approves of
each and every cooperation. Doctorow’s insight matters profoundly, as
it draws our attention to the fact that interoperability, on top of being a
problem of technology and culture, is a problem of interests and power.
That is why, sometimes, the government needs to mandate
interoperability.130 This, however, can happen in many different ways.
Let us look at what those are.
B. Regulation for, and of, Competition
We should keep in mind the distinction between regulation as a
means of obliging Facebook Inc. to open up to competition on the one
hand and regulation as means of governing the world of fifty facebooks
on the other. Whereas the former is not the only way to go (the company
could be obliged to open up because of antitrust enforcement or choose
to do so voluntarily), the latter will most certainly be necessary to, first,
sustain the interoperability of services and, second, account for certain
types of externalities.

127

See Doctorow, supra note 118.
Id.
129 For an overview of articles advancing the concept, see Cory Doctorow, Adversarial
Interoperability, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2019/10/adversarial-interoperability.
130 See Bennett Cyphers & Cory Doctorow, A Legislative Path to an Interoperable
Internet, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 28, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/
07/legislative-path-interoperable-internet (“If Facebook and Twitter allowed anyone to
fully and meaningfully interoperate with them, their size would not protect them from
competition nearly as much as it does. But platforms have shown that they won’t choose
to do so on their own. That’s where governments can step in: regulations could require
that large platforms offer a baseline of interoperable interfaces that anyone, including
competitors, can use. This would set a ‘floor’ for how interoperable very large platforms
must be. It would mean that once a walled garden becomes big enough, its owner needs
to open up the gates and let others in.”).
128
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First, consider regulation as the means for obliging Facebook Inc.
to open up and give competitors access to its service and network. The
United States Congress or the European Union could pass a law
requiring that facebook operators make themselves open to and
interoperable with other services on this market. In fact, first steps in
that direction have already been taken, with the ACCESS Act in the US131
(currently in stalemate) and the newly proposed Digital Services Act in
the EU.132 As of today, however, no such requirement exists. The precise
content of such an obligation depends on the political choices made. For
example, one can imagine the government requiring that Facebook Inc.
adopt certain standards but allowing it to develop those standards in
cooperation with the industry. This would be a mix of a publicly
mandated interop, the details of which the private actors work out.
Alternatively, the government could mandate not only adoption but
certain standards as well.133 Moreover, one should remember that on
top of mandating interoperability, the lawmakers might have to remove
certain legislative instruments currently allowing platforms to block
access technically, sometimes even through criminal actions, like the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.134 Such a move is already foreseen
(subject to limitations) in the DSA135 when it comes to research, and in
the DMA when it comes to competitors.136
What precisely the enforcement mechanisms for these rules should
be is a question beyond this paper’s scope. One option is monetary fines
for refusing to open up to competition via interoperability, issued by one
of the existing regulatory agencies—the most obvious candidate in the
United States being either the FCC or the FTC—or a new agency focusing
on various new technology-related problems.137 Alternatively, one can
imagine granting competitors private rights of action, a “right to

131 For a discussion of its contents and potential to facilitate interoperability, see
Kadri, supra note 3, at 36–37.
132 In the European Union, interoperability is hinted at, but at this point formally
required only in vertical relations. See Jan Penfrat, How the Parliament Stakes Out Its
DSA Position, EUR. DIGITAL RTS. (Oct. 21, 2020), https://edri.org/our-work/how-theparliament-stakes-out-its-dsa-position.
133 See Cyphers & Doctorow, supra note 130.
134 See Kadri, supra note 3, at 30 (arguing that “Congress should amend the CFAA to
clarify that the statute is inapplicable to publicly accessible websites”).
135 See the DSA, supra note 33, art. 31.
136 See the DMA, supra note 34, art. 6.
137 For examples of voices proposing creation of new “digital” agencies, regulating
(certain aspects) of the operations of tech companies, see generally Ryan Calo, Robotics
and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALI. L. REV. 513 (2015); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for
Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017); see also Chapter IV, Section 1 of the DSA, supra
note 33, at 67–74 (proposing digital service coordinators).

PALKA (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

4/8/2021 10:51 AM

FIFTY (INTEROPERABLE) FACEBOOKS

1233

interoperability,” and a possibility to sue Facebook Inc. (or anyone else)
if they refuse access.
Second, once we achieve this goal of creating the world of fifty
facebooks, we will need to regulate this market. On the one hand, issues
like technical standards for interoperability, safety standards,
transparency, and accountability rules make up essential elements of
the legal landscape for sustaining the “world of fifty facebooks.” We
need to be sure that a user of A-Book can communicate with a user of BBook. Importantly, we must allow users that currently have accounts
on Facebook to migrate to these other services with their existing
content and connections.138 We also need to significantly increase the
societal ability to monitor the activities of facebook providers.139 On the
other hand, given the existence of externalities in the data-driven
world,140 we might want to ban certain types of activities like
discrimination and manipulation altogether.
Thomas Kadri insightfully points out that, with easier data flows,
the risks of data abuse, including privacy risks, might increase. In his
words, “If Congress facilitates data collection and interoperability in the
ways I propose, it will become essential for legislators to pass a
comprehensive data privacy law as well. The United States still lacks
legislation to regulate privacy in many aspects of our daily lives.”141
Kadri calls for a federal privacy regulation, akin to the EU’s GDPR or the

138 One of the legal tools that consumers and emerging competitors could make use
of is the right to “data portability,” currently granted to the residents of the European
Union. See Inge Graef, Martin Husovec & Nadezhda Purtova, Data Portability and Data
Control: Lessons for an Emerging Concept in EU Law, 19 GERMAN L.J. 1359, 1361 (2018).
139 See Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age
of Surveillance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1563 (2019) (“An irony of the information age is
that the companies responsible for the most extensive surveillance of individuals in
history—large platforms such as Amazon, Facebook, and Google—have themselves
remained unusually shielded from being monitored by government regulators.”). A lot
of provisions of the DSA foresee such mechanisms. See, e.g., the DSA, supra note 33, arts.
13, 19, 23, 24, 28, 30, 33.
140 See Pałka, supra note 65, at 595 (“By allowing a company to collect and study
information about myself, even if we assume I am fully aware of what they plan to do
with my data, I impose a cost on (or at least make a decision about) you and other people.
If I make it clear what my political views or religious convictions are, essentially
everything I do online can later be used to infer knowledge about other people’s religion
and politics. ‘Everything you say can and will be used against other people’ would be a
fair statement to include in the privacy policies written within the ‘notice and choice’
paradigm. The more things I buy on Amazon, the more refined suggestions to other
customers will be. If I am convinced, or not convinced, by a political ad, I help ensure
that its next reiteration will be even more successful in manipulating people’s
preferences and behavior. Even if I fully agree to the collection of my data, I impose
costs on you and our fellow humans. I should not be allowed to do this so easily.”).
141 Kadri, supra note 3, at 38.
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California Consumer Privacy Act.142 This is definitely necessary but
arguably insufficient. One should remember that these instruments are
aimed mostly at ensuring fairness in data processing by endowing
individuals with certain rights and introducing transparency and
accountability requirements.143 They do not, however, speak to the
legality of particular purposes of data processing, like content or ad
personalization, nor to problems like data-driven discrimination144 or
manipulation.145 The emergence of competition may take care of some
of these problems, but we must outlaw others across the board. How
exactly to proceed is not predetermined; on the contrary, a democratic
and political process should help us establish that.146
Similar to regulation, antitrust enforcement could play a dual role
in creating the world of fifty facebooks. On the one hand, direct antitrust
action against Facebook Inc. could be the means of obliging it to open up
to the competition. This could happen under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act147 in the United States or under Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).148 Both of these provisions
forbid abuse of the dominant position on a given geographical and
product market.149 Enforcement actions by the FTC or the European
Commission could be the way of legally obliging Facebook Inc. to open
up to the competition. The chances, given the current jurisprudence in
the US and the EU, seem rather low; however, with the large wave of
progressive thought urging us to rethink the antitrust right now,150 a
change in practice might be on the horizon. The newly initiated FTC
lawsuit against Facebook Inc. is a perfect start to requiring the company
142

See id.
For an overview of consumer rights and transparency requirements in the GDPR
and the CCPA, see ONETRUST DATAGUIDANCE &FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, COMPARING PRIVACY
LAWS: GDPR V. CCPA (2018).
144 See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALI.
L. REV. 671 (2016).
145 See Kilovaty, supra note 9.
146 See Viljoen, supra note 64.
147 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
148 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
102, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47.
149 See id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
150 See BILL BAER, JONATHAN B. BAKER, MICHAEL KADES, FIONA SCOTT MORTON, NANCY L. ROSE,
CARL SHAPIRO & TIM WU, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, RESTORING COMPETITION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A VISION FOR ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND
CONGRESS (Nov. 2020), https://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/restoring
competition.pdf; Jonathan B Baker, Jonathan Sallet & Fiona Scott Morton, Unlocking
Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1916 (2017); Guggenberger, supra note 5; Khan,
supra note 24; Ramsi Woodcock, The Antitrust Case for Consumer Primacy in Corporate
Governance, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1395 (2020).
143
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to open up.151 Here one should remember that the lawsuit does not need
to end up with a court judgment, but quite possibly will result in a
settlement. The FTC, when it comes to the negotiations, should push for
horizontal interoperability in the market for facebooks.
On the other hand, adequately enforced antitrust law, especially
mergers and acquisitions control, will be an essential tool for
guaranteeing that a new monopolist will not re-emerge. Here, the tool
to bear in mind is Section 7 of the Clayton Act in the United States, which
prohibits mergers and acquisitions if the outcome “substantially []
lessen[s] competition, or [] tend[s] to create a monopoly.”152 The FTC
lawsuit against Facebook Inc. is a tremendous step in that direction. In
addition, the antitrust laws might help with fighting against the
emergence of cartels and collusive behavior that Article 101 of TFEU in
the EU and Section 1 of the Sherman Act in the United States prohibit.
Also, these tools will be crucial to ensuring that after the emergence of
the world of fifty facebooks, we will not gradually return to where we
are now.
In sum, the legal intervention should focus on (i) obliging Facebook
Inc. to open up to competition; (ii) sustaining interoperability and
competition in the market for facebooks; and (iii) mitigating certain
horizontal risks in this market, like privacy, security, manipulation, and
discrimination. There is no one best way to achieve all these aims; in
this Section, I wanted to sketch an overview of the available tools.
C. Objections
Having provided an argument for the law to mandate
interoperability in the market for facebooks, I would like to begin
wrapping up this Article by addressing several objections that have
been raised regarding interoperability in general. I do not claim to
refute them here—doing so in one short section would necessarily
require turning them into straw persons, which I would strongly prefer
to avoid. But for the sake of the argument, I want to signal what these
objections are and hint at the pathways for addressing them. These
include: (a) privacy and security risks; (b) risk of increased
homogeneity and stifling of innovation; (c) proprietary claims of the
large platforms; (d) distributive effects privileging the rich at the
expense of the poor; and (e) lowering the reliability of regulatory
oversight that platforms currently undertake.

151

See the FTC’s Facebook lawsuit press release, supra note 2.
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (original version at ch. 323, § 7,
38 Stat. 730 (1914)).
152
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Let us start with privacy and security.153 One could argue that as
long as Facebook Inc. keeps all the data to itself, given its expertise and
available funds, the privacy risks are lower than they would be in the
world of fifty facebooks. In the end, it is easier to keep one set of servers
secure than fifty such sets. Moreover, closed APIs guarantee that no
nefarious actors (like Cambridge Analytica) can get access to the data
which they would abuse. Opening them up necessarily comes with
privacy risks. This objection is a very serious one, and lawmakers
should definitely keep it in mind. A couple of points should be made,
however. First, as noted in the Section above, we need to pair mandated
interoperability with legal requirements for security and privacy. The
problem is not that Facebook Inc. is super secure but the competitors
would not be; the problem is that a general consumer privacy law is way
past due. Second, as I have argued already,154 part of the problem is that
Facebook Inc. currently amasses much more data about consumers than
necessary. In a competitive market, business models offering to collect
much fewer data could emerge, thereby lowering the stakes of a
potential hack.
Further, we might fear that introducing standards (either through
the government or through the industry) will lead to a higher
homogeneity on the market and stifle innovation.155 This objection
holds water where interoperability as a general concept is concerned. In
the case of facebooks, however, we are already dealing with only one
product on the market. Introducing competition through mandated
interoperability will lead to innovation when it comes to both
functionalities and business models.
The question of innovation is closely linked with property
concerns. Advocates for business freedom could argue that Facebook
Inc. has created a neat product and so forcing it to open up to
competition violates the company’s right to do with their proprietary
algorithms and platform as they see fit. There are two ways to read this
objection: deontological (it is simply unfair to take revenue streams
away from Facebook Inc., who invented a facebook) or consequentialist
(the company invested a lot in it, and so forcing it to open up to
competition will lead to lower returns and might disincentivize future
innovators). The former version of the objection definitely points to a
real issue; however, it is conveniently silent about the amount of value
153 For a specification of this objection, and detailed analysis and partial rebuttal, see
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 120, at 75–88.
154 See supra Section III.B.3.
155 For a specification of this objection, and detailed analysis and partial rebuttal, see
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 120, at 111–27.
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that Facebook Inc. extracts from its users already—from datafication of
their lives156 to free riding on their content and labor.157 Hence, the legal
intervention proposed in this Article does not violate an innocent actor’s
rights; it limits the profitability of a business model predicated on value
extraction from billions of people. The latter consequentialist version
of the objection overlooks the simple fact that once the market opens
up, a huge incentive to innovate emerges. Of course, one might concede
that mandated interoperability in the market for facebooks will stifle
innovation in new areas. The right to monopoly profit, however,
(granted through patents, for example) is always limited in time,158 and
Facebook Inc. has had its share already.
Another serious objection points to the distributive effects of the
intervention proposed in this paper. If we imagine that a new
competitor emerges and offers a facebook service for a subscription fee,
richer consumers might switch, whereas poorer ones may be stuck with
the toxic business model and incur even higher costs than now (as
Facebook Inc. will need to, somehow, make up for the lost profit). This
phenomenon might occur both domestically and internationally, where
Facebook Inc. will try to squeeze out more profits in geographical
markets other than the US and the EU. This objection is important, and
lawmakers should keep it in mind when designing the detailed policy. It
does not have to materialize, however. First, public campaigns about
the harmful effects of using Facebook might convince some people that
$12 is worth the time and mental health they will save by switching.
Second, the horizontal regulation might render some of the most toxic
kinds of data-driven harms unlawful. Third, the choice will not have to
be binary—between either a subscription fee or Facebook Inc.—as it is
today. More competitors might emerge and still offer services “for free”
and display ads, but without the constant data collection and “tricking”
consumers into purchases.
Finally, there is the question of public policy oversight that private
companies like Facebook Inc. conduct. Rory Van Loo has documented
and scrutinized the extent to which this phenomenon already widely
occurs, including the FTC’s conscription of Facebook Inc. to police thirdparty apps offered on its platform.159 Given the number of companies
156 See COHEN, supra note 9; ZUBOFF, supra note 9. Platforms have become both key
drivers of the datafication of important resources and active legal entrepreneurs,
pursuing powerful strategies for ensuring their continued access to and de facto control
of the data on which they rely. COHEN, supra note 9, at 48.
157 See supra Section III.B.
158 See Guggenberger, supra note 5, at 8.
159 See Rory Van Loo, The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms as Public Enforcers, 106 VA.
L. REV. 467, 482–83 (2020).
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operating online, companies like Facebook Inc. have the resources to
perform oversight activities;160 and having just one Facebook makes it
easier to hold the private enforcer accountable.161 Once there are fifty
facebooks, the smaller ones might have trouble performing oversight,
and making sure that every single one of them does not abuse its
oversight powers will become much more costly and difficult. This is
also a serious objection. Each facebook does not need to perform this
private oversight separately, however—a vertically interoperable
company could do so. One could imagine all facebooks chipping in to
fund such a company for example, in a way proportionate to their
market share.
In sum, there are many objections one could raise against the idea
of legally mandated interoperability in the market for facebooks. But
even if each of them is based on a sound concern, none of them seem to
defeat the idea generally. The solution will lie in the details of the
reform. Hence, lawmakers should take note of each objection but treat
them as challenges to overcome rather than discouragement.
D. Scaling Up—Toward Anti-Platform Law?
The argument of this Article has been limited to one case study,
namely Facebook Inc. An unavoidable question arises, however—why
stop at Facebook? Why not open up other platforms like Google,
YouTube, Amazon, Twitter, etc.? Do we need or even want to live in the
world in which the vast majority of our interactions are structured
through platforms?
Julie Cohen, in her treatise on informational capitalism, observes
that platforms have become a core organizational unit of socioeconomic
interaction and that “[e]conomically speaking, platforms represent both
horizontal and vertical strategies for extracting the surplus value of user
data.”162 Importantly, however, there is no technical reason to structure
the internet this way. It was not so at the beginning, and it does not have
to be so in the future.163 Again, changing this state of affairs is a question
of both imagination and political will.
Consider some examples. YouTube is a platform hosting videos,
allowing you to search for, stream, and comment on them; it also
moderates the content it hosts. There is no reason why, however, one
160

See id. at 510–11.
On the need and tools for accountability, see id. at 516–22.
162 COHEN, supra note 9, at 42–44.
163 See Mike Masnick, Protocols, Not Platforms: A Technological Approach to Free
Speech, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. COLUM. U. (Aug. 21, 2019), https://knightcolumbia.org/
content/protocols-not-platforms-a-technological-approach-to-free-speech.
161
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company must undertake all of these activities. We could have several
services for hosting, searching, moderating, and streaming—all
interoperable with one another. We could do a similar operation with
Amazon. There could be many companies that allow listing offers,
provide searching abilities, and mediate contracts between buyers,
sellers, and couriers. Just as we enacted “antitrust” laws at the end of
the nineteenth century, taming the excessive growth of the corporate
form, we could now enact “anti-platform” laws aimed at combating the
excesses of consolidation of the technological form.
Of course, to provide an argument for such a sweeping
intervention, we need to conduct a thorough empirical and conceptual
study. Given the political climate and renewed interest in questions of
interoperability, I expect we will see quite some work devoted to these
problems. Importantly, this work should be done both top-down (from
the concept of interoperability to particular case studies) and bottomup (from the case studies to the general conclusions). This Article is just
one iteration of the latter strand.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that the “world of fifty facebooks” is
technically possible, legally achievable, and normatively desirable. I
have demonstrated how Facebook Inc.’s current conduct harms
competition, and how its business model imposes on consumers
cognitive harms, behavioral harms, and privacy-security harms while
free riding on their labor and creative content. I have shown how a
facebook has become a new type of universal mode of communication
and how the business model Facebook Inc. employs could be different,
as it is completely contingent upon the company’s business decisions,
not related to the underlying technology. The “price” we pay could be
lower, and quality of service higher, if only Facebook Inc. was obliged to
open up its platform and its network to other competitors. The law
should oblige it to do that.
As the debates about regulation of big tech—including social media
and Facebook Inc.—continue on both sides of the Atlantic, we should
remember that, as a society, we face a choice. We might either accept
the central role that platforms like Facebook play in our socioeconomic
lives and focus solely on taming the most abusive behaviors they engage
in, or we might realize that there is nothing natural or necessary about
this position and concentrate on restructuring the online power
relationships. Doing so requires imagination and political will. This
Article aims at fostering both.

